Luck seems to have three properties: It can be good or bad, but doesn’t seem to be neutral. It is the result of chance (although this one seems to be more modern) It can be applied to a sentient being (does that make my lucky rock sentient? Well no, that makes it more of a […]
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You can find the previous chapter notes here. Wittgenstein and Turing One of the aims of this chapter, Livingston says, is to see how language is finite and infinite for Wittgenstein. It has important philosophical and critical implications for how we should understand the social, political, and technical consequences of the development and spread of
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You can find the previous chapter notes here. Wittgenstein and Parmenides Livingston begins with a comparison of two statements by Wittgenstein and Parmenides. Wittgenstein: “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Parmenides: “You could not know what is not–that cannot be done–nor indicate it.” The context of Parmenides statement is the
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Chapter 1 NotesChapter 2 NotesChapter 3 Notes Derrida and Formalism Livingston states that an aim of this chapter is looking at the extent to which elements of Derrida’s deconstruction are a reflection on formalism and a parallel to metalogical results that arise from reflection on the structure and limits of language. He suggests that several
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You can find the notes to chapter 1 here and chapter 2 here. Deleuze, Plato, and the Paradox of Sense In “How Do We Recognize Structuralism” Deleuze shows some common features that are definite of structuralism. The first is the recognition of a specific domain of signification. This is distinct from the domains of the
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